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SITUATION II 
SUBMARINES 
Assurnirig that the treaty of the Conferen9e on Limi-
tation of Arman1,ent, 1921-22, relating to the use of sub-
Inarines and noxious gases in \Varfare should not be rati, 
fied, \Vhat are the privileges of a belligerent submarine~ 
CONCLUSION 
A belligerent sub1narine la \Vfully co1nmissioned a~ a 
vessel of \Var may exercise the rights of a vessel of \Var ~ 
but its nature gives it no special rights or privileges. 
NOTES 
Treaty in relation to the use of submarines and noxious 
gases in W 1arfare . 2·-It is assumed in this situation that the 
treaty in relatio.n to the use of submarines and noxious 
gases of the "T ashington Conference on the Limitation of 
Armament has :hot been ratified. 
By Article II of the_ above treaty 'tall other civilized 
powers " are invited " to express their assent" to Article I, 
\Vhich is declared to be "among the rules adopted by 
civilized nations." This reaffirmation is apparently to 
make clearer to "the public opinion of the world the 
€Stablished law." 1'he la\v as stated in Article I would 
presumably be binding, even \vithout a treaty, because it 
is declared to be " an established part of international 
la\v." 
"2 A TREATY PROPOSED AT .WASHINGTON, 1922, IN RELATION TO THE USE OF 
SUBMARINES AND NOXIOUS GASES IN WARFARE 
The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and 
Japan, hereinafter referred to as the Signa tory Powers, desiring to make 
more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations1 for the protection of 
the l:ves of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, and to pre-
39 
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Queries a'S· to articles .-Many queries have arisen as to 
the exact meaning of words and clauses in Article I of 
the treaty. These questions vary in significance, but de-
serve attention because any new statement, even of la'v 
already " adopted," should be clear to those who may be 
bound to act in accordance with its provisions. It has 
been asked whether the use of the word " adopted " in 
the preamble and in Article I had the same meaning, and 
vent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to 
conclude a Treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their Plenipoten-
tiaries: 
[Names of plenipotentiaries.] 
ARTICLE I 
The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at 
sea in time of war, the following are to be deemed ., an established part of 
international law; 
(1) A merchant vesJel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to 
determine its character before it can be seized. 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to submit 
to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure. 
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers 
have been first placed in safety. 
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt 
from the universal rules above stated ; and if a submarine can not capture 
a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of 
nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit 
the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 
AUTICLE II 
The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their 
assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be 
a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of con-
duct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon 
future belligerents. 
ARTICLE III 
The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane 
rules of existing law declared by them with re-spect to attacks upon and the 
seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person 
in the service of any Power who !}hall violate any of those rules, whether 
or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, sh~ll be 
deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and 
punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before 
the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of 
which he may be found. 
ARTICLE IV 
The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using sub-
marines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated 
, 
/ 
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 41 
it was presumed that the word referred to an act com-
pleted, or, as stated, rules " deemed an established part 
of international law." 
The first paragraph speaks of the rules enumerated 
thereunder as "adopted by civilized nations for the pro-
tection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea 
in time of 'var ." I'he history of the law of visit and 
search shows . that it was primarily concerned with mat-
in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by 
civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncom-
batants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as 
commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of 
nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between 
themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 
ARTICLE V 
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analo-
gous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the 
general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of f:uch use having 
been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are 
pHrties, 
The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be univer-
sally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience 
and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to 
be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized 
nations to adhere thereto. 
ARTICLE VI 
The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance 
with the constitutional methods of the Signatory Powers and shall take 
effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, _which shall take place at 
Washington. 
The Government of the United Sta tes will transmit to all the Signatory 
Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications. 
The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both 
authentic, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the 
United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that 
Government to each of the Signa tory Power;';. 
ARTICLE VII 
The Government of the United States will further transmit to each of 
the Non-Signatory ·Powers a duly certified copy of the present Treaty and 
invite its adherence thereto. 
Any Non-Signatory Power may ·adhere to the present Treaty by com-
municating an Instrument of Adherence to the Government of the United 
States, which will thereupon transmit to each of the Signatory and Adher-
ing Powe1·s a certified. copy of each Instrument of Adherence .. 
In faith whereof, the above named Plenipotentiaries have signe'd the 
present Treaty. 
Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thou-
sand nine hundred and twenty-two. 
88941-28--4 
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ters of property rather than life, and that prior to the 
World War loss of life was rarely involved except in case 
of attempt to escape or in case of resistance. If, "(1) A 
n1erchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be seized," 
n1eans, that after an " order to submit to visit and search" 
a vessel may be seized -without further action, it can 
scarcely be maintained that this part of Article I is "an 
established part of international la,v." Under accepted 
law the order is preliminary to the visit and search. By 
visit and search the grounds for seizure are determined, 
and visit and search precedes seizure, and seizure without. 
v·j sit and search 'vould be justified in su'ch a case only on 
the ground of resistance. The Instructions for the Navy 
of the United States issued in June, 1917, were similar 
to those of other States, and w·ere as follows: 
47. The boarding officer shall first examJne the ship's papers in 
order to ascertain her nationality, ports of departure and destina-
tion, character of cargo, and other facts deemed essential. If the 
papers furnish conclusive eYidence of the innocent character of 
vessel, cargo·, and voyage, the vessel shall be released ; if they 
furnish probable cause for capture she shall be seized and sent in 
for adjudication. (192:5. Naval War College, 27.) 
There is the further complication in this paragraph of 
the proposed treaty that the word "seizure," when used 
in the same article as" capture," would be presumed to be 
used_ in the technical sense as the terms are used in naval 
regulations, though it is not clear that this was intended. 
Further, the object of visit and search of a vessel is not 
n}lerely to determine " its character," but also to deter-
mine the character of its cargo and personnel and its 
destination, conduct, etc., as grounds for seizure. 
'The third paragraph of Article I states: 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to 
submit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed 
after ~eizure. 
If this paragraph intends to convey in the word "at-
tack" the meaning of "use of force against" in case of 
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attempt to escape or resistance to visit and search, the 
statement would be in accord with practice. There \vould 
be some doubt as to the meaning of the words "to pro-
ceed as directed after seizure." If a merchant vessel is 
in control of a prize crew there might be some question 
as to the interpretation of the clause. If, ho·wever, the 
xnerchant vessel was under escort of a vessel of war the 
liability would be recognized. It might be possible that 
after seizure a merchant vessel had been directed to pro-
ceed "\vithout prize crew or escort to a named port; then 
under this paragraph some maintain that the vessel ·would 
be liable to attack if deviating from the prescribed course. 
As the paragraph seems to read, a merchant vessel must 
not be attacked unless it refuse to submit to visit and 
search after vvarning or (refuse) to proceed as directed 
after seizure, it may be said that this clause "or to pro-
ceed as directed after seizure " did not appear in the 
draft resolutions as originally presented. 
It has been claimed that the fourth paragraph greatly 
extends the liabili~ty of merchant vessels to destruction 
because stating that "A 1nerchant vessel must not be de-
stroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first 
placed in safety" might imply that after placing the 
crew and passengers in safety, the vessel might la.\vfully 
be destroyed, which is not an established part of inter-
national law, and some have questioned how this restric-
tion applies in case of refusal to submit to visit and 
search. 
The second part of Article I affirmed that the above 
are universal rules, and that if a submarine can not 
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, 
the existing la \V 9f nations requires it to desist from 
attack and to pern1it the merchant vessel to proceed un-
molested. Verbal questions, such as whether the use of 
the word "desist·" was with intention to imply that the 
attack had already begun have been put forward. In 
view of the use of the word " seizure," in preceding para-
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graphs, and the use of the vYords "capture" and "seiz-
ure " in this part of Article I, there has been uncertainty 
as to the significance of these words and the order of 
action implied. 
Article II invites the assent of civilized po·wers to 
Article I as a " statement of the established lavv so that 
there may be a clear public understanding throughout 
the world of the standards of conduct by vvhich the pub-
he opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future 
belligerents." This clearly aims to secure the sanction 
of public opinion for Article I, vvhile Article III aims to 
secure legal sanction for making a man who may be 
under orders of his government and liable for disobedi-
ence to those orders, also liable to the civil or military 
authorities of any other povver, even the enemy, "as 
for an act of piracy." This is not necessarily confined to 
officers of submarines. 
Article IV affir1ns what has been further questioned, 
•~ the. practical impossibility of using sub1narines as com-
n1erce destroyers without violating, as they vvere violated 
in the recent vvar of 1914-1918, the requirements univer-
sally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of 
the lives of neutrals and noncombatants." 'rhere are 
many different points of vievv as to what are " commerce 
destroyers" and in regard to other matters. 
Some of these and other queries vvere raised at the Con-
ference on Limitation of .Armament and in the course of 
the subcommittee discussions, as may be seen from the 
official report. 
Prep(Jff'ation of treaty on subm(JJf'ines.-The treaty, as 
stated in the official report, was not referred to technical 
subcommittees for consideration and hence the discus-
sion of its provisions is found in the reports of the sub-
committee on limitation of armament. 
The original proposition as to the rules :for submarines 
was made by Mr. Root, of the American delegation, on 
December 28, 1921. Mr. Root said: 
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One fact which seemed very clear was that mere agreements 
between Governments, rules formulated among diplomats in the 
course of the ~cientific development of international law, had a 
very weak effect upon belligerents when violation would see1n to 
aid in the attainment of the great object of victory. This has 
been clearly demonstrated in the war of 1914-18. 
Another fact establi~hed by the war was that the opinion of 
civilized nations had tremendous force and exercised a powerful 
influence on the condition of belligerents. The history of propa-
ganda during the war had been a history of almost universal 
appeal to the public opinion of mankind and the result of the war 
had come largely a$ a response. 
'.rhe report further says: 
The purpose of the resolutim;1s, he was about to read was to put 
into such simple form the subject whiCh had so stirred the feel-
ings of a great part of the civilized world that the man in the 
street and the man on the farm could understand it. 
The first resolution, 1\ir. Root said, aimed at stating the exist-
ing rules, which, of course, were known to the committee but 
which the mass of people did not know, in such a form that they 
would be understood by every one. 
Mr. Root then read the following : 
"I. The signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the 
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives 
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that 
among those rules the following are to be deemed an established 
part of international law: 
"1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be captured. 
"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless' it refused to 
stop for visit and search after warning. 
"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have been first placed in safety. 
" 2. Belligerent sub1narines are not under any circumstances 
exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine 
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and 
from capture and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed 
unmolested." 
* * * * * * 
This, Mr. Root said, was a distinct pronouncement , on the 
German contention during the war in regard to the conflict 
between the convenience of destruction and the action of the 
belligerent under the rules of international law. 
I 
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Mr. Root then read the following : 
"II. The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility 
of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the 
end that the prohibition of such use shall be· universally accepted 
as a part of the law of nations, they declare their assent to such 
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto." (Con-
ference on the Limitation of Armament,3 p. 594.) 
Discussion of treaty.-When taken up for discussion on 
December 29, 1921, Mr. Balfour (British) and Admiral 
de Bon (French) adhered in principle to the propositions 
of Mr. Root. 
Senator Schanzer said that he associated himself entirely with 
Mr. Balfour's and Ad1niral de Bon's remarks. The Italian delega-
tion at the preceding meeting gave its full adherence to the aim 
to which Mr. Root's proposal tended, but they also thought that 
the question of formulating niles for the use of submarines in 
war was, above all, a legal question, whi~h ought to be examined 
by a competent committe-e of jurists. (Ibid. p. 606.) 
Replying to certain questions of Senator Schanzer, Mr. 
Root said: 
First, as to the agreement of Resolution I of the resolutions now 
before the committee, with the second resolution relative to the 
prohibition of making use of submarines as commerce destroyers, 
which Senator Schanzer deemed inconsistent with Resolution I. 
Resolution I was a statement of existing law; Resolution II, if 
adopted, would constitute a change) from the existing law and 
therefore it was impossible to say that it was not inconsistent. 
If it were not inconsistent, there would be no change. Resolu-
tion II could not be consistent with Resolution I and still make 
a change. 
The report continues: 
Senator Schanze·r had also suggested that the Resolution I be 
completed by including a definition of "a merchant ship." 
Throughout all the long history of international law no term bad 
been better understood than the term "a merchant ship." 
It could not be ·made clearer by addition of definitions which 
would only serve to we·aken and confuse it. The merchant ship, 
3 These references are to the fun report printed in English and French. 
Government Printing Office, 1922. 
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its treatment, its rights, its protection, and its immunities, were 
at the base of the law of nations. Nothing was more clearly or 
better understood than the subject called "merchant ship." (Ibid. 
p. 610.) 
* * * * * * * 
Mr. Root declared he was opposed to the reference of this reso-
lution to a committee of lawyers or to any other emnmittee. He 
asked for a vote upon it bere. If the delegation of any country 
represented here had any error to point out in it, he was ready 
to correct it, but he asked for a vote upon it in furtherance· of the 
principle to which every one of his colleagues around the table 
had given his adherence. 
Mr. Root said that, in answering Senator Schanzer's very dis-
criminating question regarding the relations between Resolutions 
I and II, he had omitted to say that, of course, if the second 
resolution were adopted by all the' world, it would supersede 
Resolution I. This, however, would be a long, slow process and 
during the inte·rval the law as it stood must apply until an agree-
ment was reached. Resolution I also explained in authorized 
forin the existing law and could be brought for·ward when the 
public asked what changes were proposed. In proposing a change, 
he said, it was: necessary to m3;ke clear what the existing law 
was. It was very important to link this: authoritative statement 
in Resolution I with the new principle proposed in Resolution II. 
(Ibid. p. 618.) 
Mr. Balfour, on the afternoon of Dece:r_nber 29, 1921, 
said of the British Empire delegation-
the members of that delegation ·would have preferred that the 
document itself shou:d have been rendered unnecessary by the 
aboliUon of submarines. Since they had not been able, to carry 
out this policy, however, Mr. Root's resolution provided them with 
an alternative. (Ibid. p. 630.) 
Mr. Hughes, on the same day, said: 
Such a declaration as the one proposed in the first resolution 
would go to the whole world as an indication that, while the com-
mittee could not agree on such limitation, there was no disagree-
ment on the question that submarines should never be used con-
trary to the principles of law governing war. (Ibid. p. 636.) 
Drafting commdttee.-The first resolution, later .Article 
I of the submarine treaty, was referred to a drafting com-
mittee of one member from each delegation, Mr. Root 
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being named from the American delegation; Sir Auck-
land Geddes, from the British; Admiral de Bon and Mr. 
Kammerer, from the French ; Signor Ricci, from the 
Italian; Mr. Hanihara, from the Japanese. The other 
provisions were also referred to the same committee. 
Mr. Hughes, speaking of the second resolution, which 
later became Article IV of the treaty, said: 
This resolution fundamentally recognized, however, the practical 
impossibility of using submarines. as commerce destroyers without 
violating the requirements. universally accepted by civilized na-
tions for the protection of neutrals: and noncombatants.. He as-
sumed the resolution to mean that, while the rules of war were as 
stated in the first resolution-at least in substance-and while it 
was the sense of the powers there represented that they should 
be adhered to and clearly understood, the civilized world would 
be asked to outlaw the submarine· as a weapon against commerce. 
(Ibid. p. 638 ) 
Resolution /.-Resolution I was presented by the draft. 
ing committee on January 5, 1922, as follows: 
I. The signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the 
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives 
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that 
among those rules the following are to be dee·med an established 
part of international law: 
(1) A merchant ve·ssel must be ordered to submit to visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be seized. 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to sub~ 
mit to visit and search after warning or to proce .. ed as directed 
after seizure. 
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have been first placed in safety. 
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances ex-
empt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine 
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and 
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed un-
molested. (Ibid. p. 686.) 
"Merchant ves-sel" and1 " capt'ure .. "-Senator Schanzer 
requested the following entries in the minutes of the 
subcommittee : 
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It is declared that the meaning of Article II is as follows: 
Submarines have the same obligation and the same rights as sur• 
face craft. 
And: 
With regard to the· third paragraph of Articie I it is understood 
that a distinction is1 made between the deliberate destruction of 
a merchant vessel and the destruction which may result from 
a lawful attack in accordance with the rules of the seGond para-
graph. If a war vessel under the circumstances described in 
paragraph 2 of Article I lawfully attacks a merchant vess~l, it 
can not l1e held that a war vessel, before attacking, should put 
tbe crew and passengers of the merchant vessel in safety. (Ibid. 
p. 686.) 
_ I.ater the report says: 
B nator Schanzer stated that the Italian delegation accepted 
Resulution I, but that, so far as they were concerned, the appli-
cation of the resolution was subject to the two statements made 
by him in the subcommittee as entered on the minutes of the 
first meeting (December 31, 192:1) of the subcommittee of five 
011 drafting and as just read by Mr. Root. 
Senator Schanzer stated in addition that the Italian delega-
tion understood the term "merchant vessel" in the resolution to 
refer to unarmed merchant vessels. 
Mr. Hanihara said that he wished to suggest that the word 
"seize" should be substituted for "capture" in the last paragraph. 
Mr. Root, replying to Mr. Hanihara, said that the subcommittee 
understood the word " capture " to describe the whole process, 
one step of which was seizure and that it was intended to make 
the term "capture" comprehensive. (Ibid., p. 688.) 
Senator Schanzer said he did not deny that under existing rules 
of international law a merchant vessel might properly carry a 
limited armament for defensive purposes, but he wished to say 
that the Italian interpretation of the tern1 "merchant vessel" 
took into account this· limitation. IIe therefore repeated that 
the Italian interpretation was in accord with his preceding decla-
ration and with the existing rules of international law. (Ibid. p. 
6912.) 
Mr. Hughes said: 
He assumed that. all the representatives present accepted the 
proposition that merchant vessels, as merchant vessels-a category 
well known-stood where they were under the law, and that this 
resolution defined the duties of submarines with respect to them. 
(Ibid. p. 692. ) 
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Mr. Root later hin1self explained Article I: 
It will be observed that the statement . in this treaty of the 
rules relating to visit and search and seizure does not undertake 
to state all the rules of international law upon that subject. It 
was not intended to state all such rules. It was not intended to 
be a codification of international law relating to visit and search 
and seizure. The purpose was to state only the most important 
rules for the protection of innocent life so briefly and simply that 
every intelligent person could understand them, and to refrain 
from .. confusing the unscientific mind by the introduction of the 
less important details. This was · required by the main consider-
ation upon which the treaty relies for its effectiveness. The 
treaty is not n1erely a declaration of existing l3:w. It is not 
merely an agreement between governmentS' resulting from diplo-
n1atic negotiation. It is all these, but above all, it is an appeal 
to the public opinion of mankind to establish and maintain a 
fundamental rule of morals applied to international conduct in 
the form of a rule of international law. (Men and Policies, p. 
462. Address American Society of International Law, April 27, 
1922.) 
Resolution I /.-Resolution II later became Resolution 
III and finally Article IV of the submarine treaty. As 
presented on the afternoon of January 5, 1922, it was as 
follo,vs: 
" The signatory po,vers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroye~rs '\Vithout violating the 
require·ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the, lives of neutrals and noncombatants and to the 
end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted 
as a part of the law of nations they declare· their assent to such 
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto." (Con-
ference on the Limitation of Armament, p. 694.) 
Mr. Sarraut then read the· f.ollowing statement: 
"The Germans have· made war on com1nerce almost exclusively · 
with their submarines, which were instructed · to sink without 
mercy the merchant vessels of _ the· enemy with the object of de· 
st1·oying that ene~my's commerce. The abominable program was 
made worse by sinking, without distinction, steamers and hospital 
ships as well as vessels carrying cargo-neutrals as well as those 
of the enemy. These ships were destroyed without the passenge·rs 
and crew having been first put in a place of safety. France· has 
already proclaimed and she has reiterated her denunciation of the 
barbarous methods thu..q used contrary to the law of humanity and 
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she has condemned the': pitiless destruction of merchant ships as 
contrary to international law. With these views, the· French dele-
gation fully indorses the spirit of Senator Root's resolution and of 
the a1nendment proposed by Mr. Balfour. But the delegation con-
::;lders it desirable that the· sentiment of condemnation of the meth-
ods employed in the last war should be expressed in the resolution, 
and for this purpose it suggests the addition of the words 'in the 
· manner that was employed in the last war' at the· end of the 
phrase. 
''The first phrase of the resolution would then read as follows: 
" 'The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using supmarines. as, commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the pro-
tection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants in the manner 
that was e·mployed in the last war.'" 
The chairman said that Mr. Sarraut had called attention to the 
amendment which had been proposed by Mr. Balfour. The resolu-
tion, as it had been read a moment before, had not included that 
an1endment and therefore it should be restated ; he would, there-
fore, read Resolution III with the a1nendment proposed by Mr. 
Balfour: 
"The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility ot 
using submarines as commerce destroy~rs without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the· pro-
tection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end 
that the prohibition of such use· shall be universally accepted as a 
part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as 
henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all 
other nations to adhere thereto." 
That was the resolution before the committee with the amel).d-
ment suggested by Mr. Balfour. Mr. Sarraut had suggested that 
it should alsp. embrace a reference to the methods adopted by the 
Imperial German Government in the last war, which had received 
general condemnation. As. he understood it, the resolution, with 
the amendment of Mr. Balfour and the further amend1nent pro· 
posed by Mr. Sarraut, would read as follows: 
"The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants. in the man· 
ner that was employed in the last war, and to the end that the 
prohibition of such us:e shall be universally accepted as a part of 
the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as henceforth 
binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations 
to adhere thereto." 
52 SUBMARINES 
The question before the committee 'vas the· adoption of this 
resolution. Before the discussion proceeded, he wished to ask Mr. 
Sarraut whether the words which Mr. Sarraut desired inserted, to 
wit, "in the manner that was employed in the last war," were 
to be inserted at the place which had been indicated. 
Mr. Root said that Admiral de Bon and he had worked out a 
phrase on the exact line of Mr. San·aut's and he wondered whether 
it would not meet the purpose. After the word "violating" the · 
words "as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918," 
should be inserted, so that the resolution would read: 
" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the require-
nlents universally accepted by civilized natiqns," etc. 
The chairman asked 'vhether this wording was agreeable to Mr. 
Sarraut. 
Mr. Sarraut assented. 
The chairman said he would read the complete resolution, so 
that there would be no question upon what action was being 
taken: 
"The signatory po,vers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent 'var of 1914-1H18, the require-
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that 
the prohibition of such use shall be' universally accepted as a part 
of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as hence-
forth binding as between themselves, and they invite all other 
nations to adhere thereto." 
Mr. Balfour ~aid he wished to ask a question in regard to the 
amendment, now slightly modified, which Mr. Sarraut had pro-
posed and which read as follows : 
"The signatory powe·rs recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as comme·rce· destroyers 'vithout violating, as 
they were violated in the re·cent war of 19·14-1918, the require-
ments universally accepted by civilized nations," etc. 
If that w~re intended merely as .an illustration it might be wise 
or unwise; it n1ight be necessary or unnecessary; at any rate, 
used in this manner, it could do no hann. It added fonn and 
perhaps picturesqueness to the whole resolution. He wished to 
ask, however, whether:· it was not possible so to twist the· phrase 
that the article would apply only to German methods. The in-
genuity of man for wrongdoing was very great. Was it not 
unfortunate that the wrongdoers should be hampered only by 
the methods adopted by the Germans? 'Vould it not be possible 
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rur them to say, "It is true we have used our subn1arines as com-
merce destroyers, but -vve· have not used them as the· Gennans 
did, and consequently we are not violating this resolution." 
Perhaps the question he asked was oversubtle, but it appeared to 
be worthy of conside·ra tion. 
l\ir. Root asked whether that question would not be olJviated 
uy silnply repeating the· words "The, use· of sub1narines as com-
merce destroyers" in the place of "'o.f such use·." 
Mr. Balfour replied in the affirmative. 
The chairn1an asked whether that a1nenclment was acceptable. 
Adn1iral de Bon said that his reasons, as already stated by Mr. 
Sarraut, \Vere· based upon the fear that the Germans might use 
the first draft suggested as a pretext to justify some of their 
actions during the recent war. They 1night claim that, if the 
'Vashington Conference took the ground that it was not possible 
to use submarines otherwise than in contravention of actual inter-
national law, they were in a 1neasure absolved. This was the only 
idea that he had sought to convey. In his opinion the·re ought to 
be a full and complete condemnation of these methods. It was for 
this reason that the French delegation had desired specifically to 
object to German practices and thus to remove all possibility of 
tbeir being able to use the· resolution in que·stion to justify their 
conduct. 
The chainnan asked whether the amend1nent as suggested was 
acceptable. The amendment was that the· clause: "To the end 
tbat the· prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a 
part of the· law of nations" should read "to the end that the 
prohibition of the use~ of submarines as com1nerce destroyers shall 
be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations." 
The chairman said that the reason he· asked whether this wa::, 
acceptable was that it was an amendment to meet the amendment 
.suggested by Mr. Sarraut, and therefore really formed part of 
the amendment in the line suggested, and he thought it would be 
well to know whether there was any objection to the· amplifica-
tion of Mr. Sarraut's amendment in that manner. 
Mr. Sarraut replied that he had no objection. 
The chairman said that in view of what had just been saicl by 
Admiral de Bon, it might be· well to call attention to the fact that 
this resolution was not, and did not purport to be·, a state1nent 
of existing law ; it purported to go beyond existing law and to pro-
hibit the use of submarines as com1nerce destroyers. (Ibid. pp. 
6.94-700.) 
The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
·:_ they were violated in the recent war of 19,14-1918, the reqnire-
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ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants:, and to the end that 
the prohibition of the· use of submarines as commerce destroyer~ 
shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they 
now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as b~tween 
themselves, and they i·nvite· all other nations~ to adhere thereto. 
(Ibid. p. 710.) 
"Oon~merce des1troye1\"-Lord Lee asked 'vhat vvas the 
precise meaning of the tern1 "commerce destroyer." 
He did not know if "comn1erce destroyer " was a recognized 
legal ter1n or whether it included the processes of attack and 
seizure referred to in the first resolution. 
Mr. Root said he· believed it covered the 'vhole process. He 
thought that "c01nmerce· destroyer" was a perfectly well-known 
term. 
Lord Lee said that doubts. were being expressed in his delegation 
as to the precite meaning of the· phrase "commerce destroyer." 
He asked whether the term "for seizures or attacks on c01nmerce" 
would not produce the same effect. 
Mr. Hoot said he thought that if the cmnmittee undertook to go 
into the details of the proces~es, it would find itself involved in 
statements. which 'vere neither clear nor intelligible to the common 
mind, and that it really did not accomplish its purpose as well as 
would be done by the use of perfectly well-known tenns, such as 
" cmnmerce destroyers." (Ibid. p. 700.) 
* * * * * * 
:Mr. Hanihara said he desired to be inforn1ed with respect to 
the exact meaning of the term " commerce destroyer." As he· had 
already pointed out in a previous discussion, he believed that the 
words 'vere intended to apply to vessels suitable for destruction 
of merchant shipping. * * * 
l\lr. Root said he thought that the prohibition would apply to 
submarines attacking or seizing or capturing or destroying mer-
chant vessels under any circumstances, so long as the vessel re-
n1ained a merchant vessel; he also thought it was necessary to 
have an effective prohibition to have it so apply. (Ibid., p. 703.) 
Article, IV.-On January 6, 1922, Mr. Root, discussing 
"rhat later became Articles I and IV, said o£ Article IV: 
The next resolution, which forbade the use of submarines as 
com1nerce destroyers, that was. to say, forbade submarines attack-
ing merchant ships, and ·which if it were to become a part· of the 
law of nations would supersede these other rules so far as sub~ 
marine-s were concerned-but which would not supersede them 
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until it had become a part of the law of nations-was an entirely 
different proposition. It certainly was not competent for them 
to make an agreement between the, five powers here that would 
produce the effect of a law of nations upon which they could de-
nounce a punishment as for piracy. (Ibid., p. 722.) 
Presentation. to conference.-On February 1, 1922, at 
the plenary session at the Conference on the Limitation 
of Armament, Mr. Root presented the treaty on subma-
rines with the follo\ving explanation: 
You will observe that this. treaty does not undertake to codify 
international law in respect of visit, search, or seizure of 1nerchant 
vessels. 'Vhat it does undertake t01 do is to state the most important 
and effective provision& of the law of nations in regard to the 
treahnent of 1nerchant_ vessels by belligerent warships, and to 
declare that subn1arines a:re under no circu1nstances exempt from 
these humane rules for the protection of the life of innocent 
noncon1ba tan ts. 
It undertakes further to ~tigmatize violation of these rules, and 
the doing to death of women and children and noncombatants 
by the · wanton destruction of merchant vesse:s upon which they 
are passengers, a~: by a violation of the laws of war which, as be-
tween these five great powers and all other civilized nations who 
shall giye their adherence thereto, shall be henceforth punished 
as an act of piracy. 
It undertakes further to preyent temptation to the violation of 
these rules by the use of tubmarines for the capture of 1nerchant 
vessels and to prohibit that u~e altogether. It undertakes fur-
ther to denounce the use of poisonous gas8s and chemicals in 
war as they were u ~ed to the horror of all civilization in the war 
of 1914--1918. (Ibid. p. 268.) 
Adn~iral Knapp's co1nrnent.-A resolution for the ap-
pointment of a commission of jurists to consider whether 
existing rules cover ne·w methods of \Varfare was adopted 
at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, but a 
later resolution removed from their competence the con-
sideration of submarines and gas ·warfare. Of this reso-
lution Admiral Harry S. l(napp, United States Navy, 
'v-riting shortly before his death, said: 
But the most extraordinary limitation on the powers of the 
commission is to be found in resolution No. 2 of the1 Washington 
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Conference. This was adopted by the same signatory powers that 
a dopted resolution No. 1 and at the same session. It reads: 
" R e.solved, That it is not the intention of the powers agreeing 
to the appointment of a commission to consider and report upon 
the rules of international law respecting new agencies of warfare 
that the ·commission shall review or report upon the rules or 
declarations relating t o submarines or the use of noxious gases 
and chem.icals already adopted by the powers in this conference." 
Resolution No. 2 can only mean that the delegates of the signa-
tory powers were so entirely satisfied with the work of the con-
ference regarding submarine and gas warfare as to rega rd it as 
the last word in form and substance ; otherwise they would not 
have removed the r ight to re·view or report upon t he rules and 
declarations of that treaty from the commission they themselves 
had just created to study the broad qvestion, of which submarine 
and gas warfare are such integral and outstanding parts. 
Such satisfaction is not universally shared. The need for 
revision of the la\VS of war is manifest; and it is regrettable that 
a com1nission of dist inguished jurists should have been called 
together for that purpose with such a limitation upon their action 
as that ilnposed by resolution No. 2. 4-s for t reaty No. 2, an rit-
tE:mpt is made in what follows to show that it needs revision, 
eE;pecially in respect of its provisions regarding submarine war-
fare~a revision that The H ague commission would have been so 
competent to make. 
The present criticism of the treaty is not born of any lack of 
sympa thy with its purpose on the part of the writer. On the con-
t rary, he has exerted such influence as--- he had toward the adop~ 
t ion of a more r adical solution of the submarine problem than 
the t reaty attempts. H e would prefer to see tbe sub1narine abol-
ished. That view has not prevailed, ho\vever, and worse still, the 
vVashington Conference failed to put any limitation upon the num-
bers of submarines, relative or absolute. It consequently failed, 
potentially at least, to stop competition in submarine building. 
Under existing circumstances, and having in mind the submarine 
practices of the Germans during the war-practices that were 
such a blot upon the German national repu::ation-it was all-im-
portant that any agreement on the subject reached by the vVash· 
ington Conference should be correct in substance and form ; and 
this is especially true if that agreement was to be the· final word on 
the subject. It was the last word in so far as The Hague com-
mission is concerned; but it can not be doubted that a future 
conference on the laws. of maritime warfare, compos-ed of dele-
gates from all maritime powers so that the voice of the confer-
ence will carry real international authority, will refuse to be 
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:Shackled by such a limitation as that prescribed by resolution No. 
2 of the 'Vashington Conference. (39' Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., J une, 
1924, p. 203.) 
Report of A n1erican delegation.-In the report of the 
_American delegation to the President on February 9, 
1922, there are reprinted certain parts of the report of the 
advisory committee of t\Yenty-one, and of this report on 
submarines the delegation says "this report was presented 
by the American delegation as setting forth in a succinct 
manner the position of their Government." In this re-
port it \vas stated : 
The submarine as a n1an-of-war has a very vital part to play. 
It has emne to stay. It 1nay strike without warning against com-
batant vessels, as snrfaee ships may do also, but it must bei re-
-quired to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when 
opposing merchantmen as at other times. (Conference on the 
Lin1itation of Armament. Sen. Doc. No. 126, 67th Con~., 2d sess., 
p, 814.) 
* * * * * * * 
The committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited warfare 
·by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right of 
visit and search must be exercised by submarines under the same 
:rules as for surface vessels. (Ib~cl. p. 815.) 
Immediately following this report is the treaty upon 
:Submarines, and as introductory thereto is the following 
})aragra ph : 
vVhile the conferenee \Yas unable either to abolish or to lhnit 
subinarines, it stated, with e~arity and force, tbe existing rules 
of international law which conde1nned the abhorrent practices 
followed in the recent war in the use of submarines against n1er-
ehan t vessels. (Ibid. p. 815.) 
The report also repeats ~Ir. Root's. statement to the 
conference \vhen, speaking of the submarine treaty and 
the rules of maritime war, he said: 
It undertakes further to prevent ten1ptation to the violation of 
these rules by the use of submarines for the capture of Iner-
·Chant vessels, and fo prohibit that use altogether. (Ibid. ·p . 816.) 
Summary.-Article I of the treaty, aiming as the whole 
treaty does, to protect the lives of neutrals and noncom-
88041-28--5 
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batants, considers in successive paragraphs visit and 
search before seizure, attack after refusing visit and 
search, or to pro ~ eed as directed after seizure, destruction 
without placing personnel in safety, and the application 
of these so-called universal rules, and adds-
and if a subn1arine can not capture a merchant vessel in con-
formity with these rules the ex~sting 1a\v of nations requires 
it to desist from attack and frcm seizure and to permit the· mer-
chant vessel to proeeed unmolested. (Conference on Limitation of 
Armament, p. 836.) 
By this last clause the submarine is required under 
certain conditions, to desist " from attack and from 
seizure." l\1anifestly it is not the ~ purpose to deny the 
right of visit and search, but, as Mr. Root says, "to de-
c:are that submarines are, under no circumstances, exempt 
from those hun1ane rules for the protection of the life 
of innocent noncombatants," and Article I itself simply 
declares "that among the rules adopted by civilized na-
tions " "the follo\Ying are to be deemed an established part 
of international lavv." The discussion in the conference 
indicates this understanding. 
The conclusion is that Article I does not change exist-
iEg la \V but, as said in Article II, aims to establish " a 
clear public understanding throughout the \VOr ld of the 
standards of conduct by ·which the public opinion of the 
V\Torld is to pass judgment upon future belligerents." 
Further in Article III penalty " as if for an act of 
piracy " is provided for " attacks upon and the seizure 
and destruction of merchant ships " in violation of these 
rules. 
In the original proposal Mr. Root stated the first reso-
lution as follo,vs: "A merchant vessel must be ordered to 
stop for visit and search to determine its character before 
it can be captured." I...Jater, in reply to Mr. Hanihara, 
\V ho suggested " seize " instead of " capture " in a later 
paragraph of the same article, Mr. Root said "that the 
subcommittee understood the \Vord 'capture' to describe 
the whole process, one step of \Vhich V\'as seizure, and it 
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'vas intended to make the term' capture' co1nprehensive." 
(Ibid. p. 688.) 
It was not understood that this t~rm included visit and 
search, as by the article itself visit, and search must pre-
cede capture or seizure, and was to determine the char-
acter of the merchant vessel and its liability to seizure or 
capture. 
Early opinions-.-Visit and search as necessarily pre .. 
ceding seizure or capture has long been recognized. Sir 
\Villiam Scott in the case of the Maria in 1799 declared 
he takes it to be incontrovertible-
That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the 
high seas, whatever be the· ships:, whateYer be thP cargoe·s, what-
ever be the destinations:, is an incontestablP right of the lawfully 
commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation. I say, be the ships, 
the cargoes, and the destinations what they may, because, till they 
are visited and searched, it does not appear what the ships, the 
cnrgoes, or the destinations are; and it is for the purposp of ascer-
taining these points that the necessity of this right of visit and 
search exists. This right is so clear .in principle, that no man 
can deny· it who admits: the legality of maritilne capture; because 
if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether 
there is property that can be legally captured, it is: impossibJe to 
capture. . In short, no man in the least degree con-
versant in subjects of this kind has ever, that I kno\v of, breathed 
a doubt upon it. (1 C. Robinson, p. 340.) 
Similarly in the case of the 11! arria.nna Flora Mr. Justice 
Story said of visit and search : 
This right is strictly a belligerent right, allowed by thP general 
consent of nations: in time of war, and limited to those occasions. 
( 11 "\Yhea ton, 1 ) 
:No treaty 'vonld renounce such a generally recognized 
1·ight as visit and search, 'vhich is the subject of so many 
treaty agreements, 'vithout. express stipulation. From a 
practical standpoint the exercise of visit and search when 
camouflage or other concealment of identity are possible 
and much resorted to is essential to the conduct of 'var 
on the seas. This seems to be admitted in the first clause 
of the provisions of Article I which states "a merchant 
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vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to 
determine its character before it can be seized." Further, 
it may be said that visit and search does not necessarily 
imperil " the lives of neutrals and noncombatants " \Yhich 
ii is the aim of the submarine. treaty to protect. 
Gern~an practice, 1914-1918.-Gerinany on February 4, 
1915, proclaimed the ·waters about Great Britain and Ire-
land a \Yar zone in \vhich every enemy merchant ship 
\Yould, after February 18, "be destroyed without it being 
always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews 
and passengers on that account." Neutral vessels \Vere 
\Yarned that they were exposed to ~anger in the war zone, 
because neutral flags had been used by belligerent mer-
chantmen and because of possible accidents. 
In \Yhat has been called the "strict accountability" note 
of Mr. Brya:q_ of February 10, 1915, it was said: 
It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German GoYernment 
that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels 
on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade j'l 
proclaimed and effectiYely maintained, which this Government doe~ 
not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise 
the right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed 
area of the high seas without first certainly detern1ining its bellig-
erent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would 
be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government 
is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany 
in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy 
ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just pre· 
sun1ption that all ships traversing a pre~ri~ed area are subject to 
the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that 
this Government understands the right of visit and. search to haye 
been recognized. (Spec. Sup. An1er. Jour. Int. Law, July, 1915, 
p. 86.) 
Germany had previously attempted to justify, on the 
ground of retaliation, its action, \vhich \Vas ad1nittedly 
beyond the lavv, saying: 
Great Britain invokes vital interests of the British Empire 
which are at stake in justification of its violations of the law 
of nations, and the neutral powers appear to be satisfied with 
theoretical protests, thus actually adn1itting the vital interests of 
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a belligerent as sufficient excuse for methods of waging war of 
whateveJ; description. 
The tilne has con1e for Gennany also to invoke such vital 
interests. It therefore finds itself under the necessity, to its 
regret, of taking military measures against England in retaliation 
of the practice followed by England. (Ibid. p. 85.) 
In the German note of February 16, ~915, it was said: 
:Nloreover, tl!e British Govern1nent have armed English mer~ 
chant vessels and instructed them to resist by force the Ger1nan 
subn1arines. In these circu1nstances it is very difficult for the 
German submarines to recognize neutral merchant vessels as such, 
for even a search will not be possib~e in the majority of cases, 
since the attacks to be anticipated in the case of a disguised 
English ship would expose the comn1anders conducting a search 
aud the boat itself to the danger of d~struction. 
The British Government would then be in a position to render 
Gennan measures illusory if their merchant marine persists in the 
misuse of neutral flags and neutral vessels are not marked in 
some other manner admitting of no possible doubt. (Ibid. p. 94.) 
Sir Ed,varcl Grey, in a note of February 19, 1915, 
stated: 
The obligation upon a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely 
for itself the nationality and character of a merchant vessel before 
capturing it and a fortiori before sinking and destroying it has 
been universally recognized. (Ibid. p. 97.) 
Anterican discussion.-On February 20, 1915, the 
l Tnited States, anxious to establish a modus vivevndi be-
t,veen the belligerents, proposed "That neither ·will use 
submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality 
except to enforce the right of visit-and search." Many 
notes bet,veen the belligerents and the United States 'vere 
exchanged, and Mr. Bryan, replying on Nlarch 30, 1915, 
to certain British notes, said: 
The order in council of the 15th of March would constitute, ·were 
its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a 
practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral 
commerce within the whole European area and an almost unquali4 
fied denial of the, sovereign rights of the nations now at peace. 
This Government takes it for granted that there can be no 
question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its 
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own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time 
of peace is, of course, unlimited; and that sovereignty suffers no 
diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and 
consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recognition of 
certain now clearly determined rights, which it is conceded n1ay 
be exercised by nations which are at war. 
A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and 
search, and the right of capture and condemnation, if upon exami-
nation a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service 
or to be carrying contraband of "'\Var intended for the enemy's 
government or armed forces. (Ibid. p. 117.) 
In the note of April 21, 1915, to the German ambassa-
dor, the Secretary of State said of the Government of the 
United States: 
It has, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and search as an 
absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels 
for vessels owned by an enemy· and against mistaking legal cargoes 
for illegal. (Ibid. p. 128.) 
On June 9, 1915, in a note to Germany, the United 
States said: 
Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to 
escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on 
the part of the 1nerchanhnan has ever been held to forfeit the 
lives of her passengers or crew. (Ibid. p. 139.) 
The United States has therefore insisted upon the ne-
cessity of visit and search before seizure in order to safe-
guard neutral rights and has denied the right to attack 
merchant vessels except on the ground of resistance or 
atten1pts to escape. 
Re,view~ of proposed treaty.-Article IV of the subma-
rine treaty is a "prohibition of the use of sub1narines as 
c• )mmerce destroyers." 
In reply to Lord Lee's query as to ·whether " commerce 
destroyer" was a recognized legal term, or whether it in-
cluded the process of attack and seizure referred to in the 
first resolution, ":1\fr. Root said he believed it covered the 
'vhole process. He thought 'commerce destroyer' was a 
perfectly well-kno,vn term." (Conference on I...Jimita tion 
of Ar1nament, p. 700.) 
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After discussion in the committee on limitation ot 
armament on January 5, 1922, the "\Vords " commerce de-
stroyer" were retained instead of substituting the words 
"submarines for operations against merchant vessels." 
During this discussion Senator Schanzer said: 
Submarines were military weapons and should be allowed the 
privileges of military weapons. They Inight even act in the same 
way as surface vessels. (Ibid. p. 708.) 
The expression " The signatory po-wers recognized the 
practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce 
destroyers without violating, as they w·ere violated in 
the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally 
accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the 
lives of neutrals and noncombatants" \Vas deliberately 
adopted \vith the understanding that the \vords "com-
nlerce destroyers " " was a perfectly "\Vell-kno,vn term.-" 
'I his well-kno"\vn term " commerce destroyers " in the 
common dictionary sense means a vessel " intended to 
prey on, capture, and destroy the 1nerchant shipping of 
an enemy, generally one of high speed and light arma-
ment." As this article \Vas adopted at the conference 
"\vhere limitation of naval armament "\Vas a prime object, 
It may be presumed that this n1ean!ng of the "\Vord was 
intended, particularly as the phrase in the article is 
"using submarines as commerce destroyers"; i. e., as 
light, fast vessels might be used to prey on commerce, or 
as in 1914-1918 submarines "\Yere used putting in peril the 
lives of neutrals and noncombatants. 
According to the final report of the American delega-
tion, quoting from the report of the advisory committee 
of t"\venty-one, the opinion of the American Government 
was that submarines would continue to be used against 
combatant ships and as scouts, and that "unlin1ited 'var-
fare by submari~es on commerce should be outlawed. 
The right of visit and search must be exercised by sub-
marines under the sa1ne rules as for surface vessels." 
(Sen. Doc. 126, 67th Cong., 2d sess., p. 815.) The report 
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o:f the American advisory co1n1nittee of tw·enty-one also 
stated: "If the submarine ' is required to operate under 
the same rule as combatant surface vessels no objection 
can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels." 
(Ibid. p. 813.) " This report was presented by the 
American delegation as setting forth in a succinct 1nanner 
the position of their Government." (Ibid. p. 813.) 
Article VI of the proposed treaty in relation to the use 
of submarines and noxious gases in \Varfare provided 
that it should take effect on the deposit of ratifications at 
Washington by all the signatory powe:r:,s. Up to the. pres-
ent date, December 31, 1926, these ratifications have not 
been deposited; therefore the rules governing lawful sub-
marine warfare remain unchanged. 
CONCLUSION 
A belligerent submarine la \vfully commissioned as· a 
vessel of war may exercise the rights of a vessel of -vvar-
but its nature gives it no special rights or privileges. 
